Es ist dabei selbst die historische Wahrheit eine Nebensache, ein erfundenes Beispiel könnte auch dienen; nur haben historische immer den Vorzug, praktischer zu sein und den Gedanken, welchen sie erläutern, dem praktischen Leben selbst näher zu führen. 
Introduction
It is known at least since Arrow's pioneering work (Arrow, 1950) that the real world is full of decision paradoxes. This is true even though Arrow's impossibility theorem neglects the fact that voters are strategic actors. According to the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) , all fair voting rules are susceptible to tactical voting in the case of at least three alternatives: there always exists a voter who can achieve a better outcome by being insincere.
This result may suggest that strategy-proofness is difficult to achieve in practice. Nonetheless, there are several cases when incentive compatible designs exist, but a widely used procedure is manipulable. For example, Tasnádi (2008) demonstrated that the Hungarian mixed-member electoral system, applied between 1990 and 2010, suffers from the population paradox as the governing coalition may lose seats either by getting more votes or by the opposition obtaining fewer votes. Similarly, the invariant method (Pinski and Narin, 1976 ) -characterised by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) , and used to qualityrank academic journals -is subject to manipulation because a journal can boost its performance by making additional citations to other journals (Kóczy and Strobel, 2009) .
Strategy-proofness is an especially relevant issue in sports where all contestants are familiar with the high-stake decisions involved, and they can obviously behave as strategic actors. Consequently, any tournament design should provide the players with the appropriate incentives to perform (Szymanski, 2003) .
Scientific analysis of sports ranking rules from the perspective of incentive compatibility has started recently, although sporting applications of operations research proliferate in the academic world (Wright, 2009 (Wright, , 2014 . Kendall and Lenten (2017) provides probably the first comprehensive review of sports regulations resulting in unexpected consequences. On the basis of the examples presented, three possible situations can be identified in which a team might prefer losing a game to winning it: (1) when a team might gain advantages in the next season; (2) when a lower ranked team can still qualify and it might face a preferred competitor in a later stage; (3) when a team is strictly better off by losing in certain situations due to ill-constructed rules.
The classical example for the first situation arises from the reverse order applied in the traditional set-up of player drafts, which aims to increase competitive balance over time: if a team is still certainly eliminated from the play-off, it creates a perverse incentive to tank in the later games (Fornwagner, 2018; Lenten et al., 2018) .
The second situation occurred in Badminton at the 2012 Summer Olympics -Women's doubles (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.3.1) , and has inspired some game-theoretical works addressing the strategic manipulation problem (Pauly, 2014; Vong, 2017) .
However, in the first case, the rules are deliberately designed to support underdogs, and in the second case, the team gains only in expected terms. Here, the remaining third situation will be discussed, when tournament rules are constructed such that a team is guaranteed to benefit from performing weaker. Probably the first academic work studying this issue is Dagaev and Sonin (2017) , where the authors prove that tournament systems, consisting of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments with noncumulative prizes, are often incentive incompatible.
While several football tournaments -such as qualifications for FIFA Worlds Cups (Dagaev and Sonin, 2013; Csató, 2017a) , UEFA club competitions (Dagaev and Sonin, 2017; Csató, 2018g) , and UEFA European Championships (Csató, 2018c,h ) -have been shown to be vulnerable to manipulation, it is far from trivial to identify a misaligned rule in practice since there is a low probability of failure because a scandal usually involves such an enormous cost that the particular design is almost certain to be never used again.
Perhaps the most famous case is a football match, Barbados vs Grenada (1994 Caribbean Cup qualification), when a sudden-death goal scored in extra time counted as double, creating an incentive to concede a goal at the end of the match in order to gain additional time for a necessary two-goal win (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.4) . The Barbadians exploited this perverse rule by scoring an own goal in the 87th minute (Dagaev and Sonin, 2017 , Note 1). Nonetheless, this match had not affected any third team, so one can agree with the decision of FIFA not to penalise Barbados as the players were striving for the best outcome conditional upon the prevailing rules. Despite that, the strange regulation has not been applied since then.
We have reviewed two other football matches experiencing similar problems. In the first, a Dutch team, SC Heerenveen was better off by losing than by playing a draw (Csató, 2018i) . In the second, both teams were interested in achieving a draw in order to grab the only chance to qualify (Csató, 2018d) .
A similar situation was prevented by a particular FIBA (International Basketball Federation) rule saying that 'if a player deliberately scores in the team's own basket, it is a violation and the basket does not count': in the men's tournament of the 2014 Asian Games Basketball Competition, a Philippine player shot at his own basket against Kazakhstan in order to force overtime and thus increase the margin of victory (Carpio, 2014) .
The paper will highlight that tournaments with multiple group stages, in which some match results from the preliminary round are carried over to the main round, suffer from incentive incompatibility. First, we present a handball math where a team had an incentive not to win by a high margin. Second, it is proved that this particular tournament design violates strategy-proofness in its current form. Finally, we give a mechanism to guarantee incentive compatibility: to carry over a monotonic transformation of all preliminary round results to the main round, regardless that some matches were played against teams already eliminated from the tournament. It is also shown via simulations that carrying over half of the points scored in the preliminary round does not affect essentially the selective ability and the competitive balance of the tournament, while it provides strategy-proofness and reduces the influence of seeding the teams into pots.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brings an example from handball, which may be even more serious than the football match Barbados vs Grenada as a seemingly unfair behaviour of a team led to the elimination of a third team. Section 3 contains the theoretical model and proves that a tournament with multiple group stages usually violates strategy-proofness. Section 4 lists some recent tournaments applying this design. In Section 5, we provide two incentive compatible mechanisms for organising these tournaments and explore their characteristics with respect to selective ability and competitive balance via simulations. Finally, Section 5 summarises our main findings.
A real-world example of manipulation
The European Men's Handball Championship is the official biannual competition for the senior men's national handball teams of Europe since 1994, organised by the EHF (European Handball Federation), the umbrella organization for European handball.
2 The 11th European Men's Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014) was held in Denmark between 12 and 26 January 2014. Sixteen national teams participated in the tournament. In the preliminary round, they were divided into four groups (A-D) to play in a round-robin format. The top three teams in each group qualified to the main round. Teams from Groups A and B of the preliminary round composed the first main round group X, while teams from Groups C and D of the preliminary round composed the second main round group Y. The main round groups were also organised in a round-robin format, but all matches (consequently, results and points), played in the preliminary round between the teams that were in the same main round group, were kept and remained valid for the ranking of the main round. Figure A .1 in the Appendix gives an overview of this tournament design. In the groups of the preliminary and main rounds, two points were awarded for a win, one point for a draw and zero points for a defeat. Teams were ranked by adding up their number of points. If two or more teams had an equal number of points, the following tie-breaking criteria were used after the completion of all group matches (EHF, 2014a, Articles 9.12 and 9.24): A strange situation emerged in Group C of the preliminary round, which requires further investigation. On 16 January 2014, each team in the group had one more game to play. Table 1 shows the known results and the preliminary standing of the group.
Consider the possible scenarios from the perspective of Poland. This team is certainly eliminated if it does not win against Russia. Poland carries over 0 points, 46 goals for and 48 goals against to the main round if it wins against Russia and Serbia plays at least a draw against France. On the other hand, if Poland wins by goals against Russia and Serbia loses, there will be three teams with 2 points, which obtained 2 points in the group matches played among them. Consequently, the further tie-breaking criteria should be applied: Poland, Russia, and Serbia will have head-to-head goal differences of − 1, 2 − and −1, respectively. As − 1 > −1, Poland will qualify.
Serbia is eliminated as the fourth team if 1 ≤ ≤ 2. Russia and Serbia have the same head-to-head goal difference if = 3, hence higher number of goals scored against the three teams with 2 points breaks the tie. It is 45 for Serbia and at least 27 for Russia, thus Russia qualifies if it scores at least 19 goals against Poland (if Poland vs Russia is 21-18, then the third place will depend on the result of Serbia vs France). If ≥ 4, then Serbia has a better head-to-head goal difference than Russia, so Serbia qualifies and Russia is eliminated.
To summarise, if Poland wins, it carries over its result against Russia (2 points) or Serbia (0 points) to the main round, thus Poland has every incentive to qualify together with Russia. Hence, it is unfavourable for Poland to win by more than three goals against Russia as this scenario yields no gain in the main round but may lead to a loss of 2 points if Serbia is defeated by France. Russia is clearly better off by a smaller defeat. In fact, Poland vs Russia was 24-22 and Serbia vs France was 28-31, so France, Poland, and Russia qualified to the main round with 4, 2 and 0 points, respectively. Naturally, it is not a proof that the Polish team deliberately manipulated, but the circumstances are at least suspicious. For example, the result of Poland vs Russia was 10-14 after 30 minutes (half-time), while the match stood at 21-16 in the 48th, 22-17 in the 50th, and 23-18 in the 52nd minute (EHF, 2014b).
3
The potentially unfair behaviour of Poland resulted in the elimination of a third, innocent team, Serbia, which makes the example especially worrying. Furthermore, the situation could not have been improved by playing the last group matches simultaneously because Poland's dominant strategy was independent of the result of the game played later. It seems to be a persuading argument against the rules of 11th European Men's Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014).
The model
In this section, we build a model of a tournament consisting of round-robin preliminary and main rounds, where matches played in the preliminary round against teams qualified to the same main round group are carried over. It will be revealed that these systems are incentive incompatible, that is, they are vulnerable to a manipulation such as the one presented in Section 2. Our notations follow Csató (2018c) in certain details since the qualification system discussed there is also based on round-robin groups.
Definition 3.1. Round-robin tournament: Let be a nonempty finite set of at least two teams, , ∈ be two teams and : × → {( 1 ; 2 ) : 1 , 2 ∈ N} ∪ {⋆} be a function such that ( , ) = ⋆ if and only if = , where N denotes the set of nonnegative integers. The pair ( , ) is called a round-robin tournament.
Function describes game results with the number of goals scored by the first and second team, respectively. Definition 3.1 allows for a home-and-away round-robin tournament, any two teams may play each other once at home and once at away. The first team is the one playing at home.
Definition 3.2. Single round-robin tournament:
In a single round-robin tournament, any two teams play each other only once (often at a neutral site), so the order of the teams has no significance.
Definition 3.3. Incomplete round-robin tournament:
Let be a nonempty finite set of at least two teams, , ∈ be two teams and :
The pair ( , ) is called an incomplete round-robin tournament.
In an incomplete round-robin tournament, some matches between the teams may remain to be played. Any round-robin tournament is an incomplete round-robin tournament, too.
Definition 3.4. Ranking in incomplete round-robin tournaments:
Let be the set of incomplete round-robin tournaments with a set of teams . A ranking method maps any function of into a strict order ( ) on the set .
Let ( , ) be an incomplete round-robin tournament, ( ) be its ranking and , ∈ , ̸ = be two different teams. is said to be ranked higher (lower) than if and only if
Let , ∈ , ̸ = be two different teams and
In some professional team sports (basketball, ice hockey, volleyball, etc.) draws are prohibited. Since we want to keep the model as general as possible, it is assumed that no matches result in a draw. Introducing this constraint will cause no problem because we are searching for situations that are vulnerable to manipulation, which becomes more difficult on a smaller domain.
Assumption 1. No matches result in a draw
The ranking is usually based on the number of points scored.
Definition 3.5. Number of points: Let ( , ) be an incomplete round-robin tournament and ∈ be a team. Denote by ( ) the number of wins and by ( ) the number of losses of team in ( , ), respectively. The number of points of team is ( ) = ( ) + ( ) such that > .
In other words, a win means points and a loss gives points. Number of points does not necessarily induce a strict order on the set of teams, hence some tie-breaking rules are required. Definition 3.6. Goal difference: Let ( , ) be an incomplete round-robin tournament and ∈ be a team. The goal difference of team is
Goal difference is the difference between the number of goals scored for team and the number of goals conceded by team .
Definition 3.7. Head-to-head results: Let ( , ) be a round-robin tournament and ∈ be a team. Denote by ⊆ ∖ { } a set of teams.
The head-to-head number of points of team with respect to in ( , ) is
The head-to-head goal difference of team with respect to in ( , ) is
In accordance with EHF (2014a, Articles 9.12 and 9.24), head-to-head results are calculated only in complete round-robin tournaments, after all group matches were played.
Definition 3.8. Monotonicity of group ranking:
Let be the set of incomplete roundrobin tournaments with a set of teams , and be a ranking method.
is said to be monotonic if for any function and for any different teams , ∈ :
Monotonicity implies that (a) a team should be ranked higher if it has a greater number of points (criterion 1); and (b) a team should be ranked higher compared to another with the same number of points, an inferior goal difference and worse head-to-head results against all teams with the same number of points (criterion 2). Monotonicity still does not lead to a strict ranking. The complexity of Definition 3.8 is necessary in order to cover the two different tie-breaking concepts, goal difference, and head-to-head results. For example, in association football, FIFA usually uses the former, while UEFA applies the latter.
Definition 3.9. Preliminary round:
The preliminary round consists of groups of round-robin tournaments (
Definition 3.10. Main round:
The main round ℳ consists of ℓ groups of incomplete round-robin tournaments (
Definition 3.11. Qualification rule: Let be the preliminary round and ℳ be the main round. The qualification rule is a mapping :
Team ∈ is said to be qualified to the main round if ∈ ∪ ℓ =1 .
Definition 3.12. Tournament with multiple group stages:
A tournament with multiple group stages is a triple ( , ℳ, ) consisting of the preliminary round , the main round ℳ, and the qualification rule .
Definition 3.13. Regularity of the qualification rule: Let ( , ℳ, ) be a tournament with multiple group stages. Qualification rule is regular if:
b) there exists a common monotonic ranking in each group of the preliminary round such that , ∈ , 1 ≤ ≤ and
e) there exists a common monotonic ranking in each group of the main round ℳ.
The idea behind a regular qualification rule is straightforward. Some top teams of the preliminary round groups qualify to the main round (conditions a) and b)), where they are divided into new groups such that matches already played against other qualified teams are carried over to the main round (conditions c) and d)). Furthermore, rankings in the preliminary and main round groups are required to be monotonic (conditions b) and e)).
Perhaps these ideas have inspired the decision-makers of EHF.
Definition 3.14. Manipulation: Consider a tournament with multiple group stages ( , ℳ, ) and a set of preliminary round results =
according to both ( ) and (¯) such that ( ) <¯( ), or ( ) =¯( ) and ( ) <¯( ).
Manipulation means that team can increase its number of points, or at least improve its goal difference with preserving its number of points in the main round by conceding more goals in a match of the preliminary round. The main contributions concern the strategy-proofness of tournaments with multiple group stages and a regular qualification rule. Note that manipulation certainly worsens a team's goal difference (and sometimes its number of points, too) in its preliminary round group as the ranking rule applied here is monotonic, but -provided that the team still qualifies -it may pay off in the main round when some matches of the preliminary round are discarded. • there exists , ∈ ∩ for some 1 ≤ ≤ and 1 ≤ ≤ ℓ;
• for at least one 1 ≤ ≤ , there exists , ∈ with ∈ implying / ∈ .
Then the tournament with multiple group stages ( , ℳ, ) does not satisfy strategyproofness.
According to the conditions of Theorem 3.1, the result of at least one match played in the preliminary round (between the teams and ) is carried over to main round, and the result of at least one such match (between the teams and ) is ignored.
Proof. An example is presented where a team can manipulate a tournament with multiple group stages that satisfies all criteria of Theorem 3.1. Table 2 : Group 1 of Example 3.1 GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal difference; Pts = Points. The last but one row contains the group winner's benchmark results that are carried over to the main round. The last row contains the group winner's alternative results that are carried over to the main round after it manipulates.
Position Team
Example 3.1. Let 1 = { , , } be a single round-robin group. Consider the regular qualification rule with ℓ = 1 group in the main round and ∈ 1 if and only if
says that the group winner and the runner-up qualify for the main round.
A possible set of results in Group 1 is shown in Table 2 . Team is the group-winner since it has the best (head-to-head) goal difference (see criterion 2 of a monotonic group ranking method), and it is considered with ( ) = points in the main round, after discarding its match against team , the last in Group 1 due to criterion 2 of a monotonic group ranking method (see the last but one row of Table 2 ).
However, examine what happens if¯1( , ) = (2; 0), thus¯1( , ) = (0; 2). Then teams , and remain with + points, but they have head-to-head goal differences of +1, −1 and 0, respectively, therefore is the first and is the second according to criterion 2 of a monotonic group ranking method. Consequently, team is considered with¯( ) = > = ( ) points in the main round (see the last row of Table 2 ).
To conclude, team has an opportunity to manipulate this simple tournament with multiple group stages under the set of group results , so it violates strategy-proofness.
Example 3.1 contains only three teams, which is minimal under the conditions of Theorem 3.1. It is clear that the number of groups and the number of teams in them can be increased without changing the essence of the counterexample. Groups can be double round-robin tournaments instead of single ones, too.
Theorem 3.1 also remains valid if draws are allowed in a tournament with multiple group stages.
Remark 3.1. The 11th European Men's Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014), discussed in Section 2, fits into the model presented above. The number of groups in the preliminary round is = 4, the number of groups in the main round is ℓ = 2, and the qualification rule is regular (EHF, 2014a):
b) Ranking in the preliminary round groups is monotonic as it is based on the number of points with tie-breaking through head-to-head results, and the first three teams qualify for the main round; c) Matches played during the preliminary round against opponents which qualified to the main round are kept and remain valid for the ranking of the main round;
d) Matches of the main round are played in groups with each team facing three opponents which did not participate in its preliminary round group; e) Ranking in the main round groups is monotonic as it is based on the number of points with tie-breaking through head-to-head results.
Proposition 3.1. The 11th European Men's Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2014) is not strategy-proof.
Proof. The scenario presented in Section 2 shows that team Poland = ∈ 3 can manipulate since there exist sets of group results = { 1 ,
, where team Russia = ∈ 3 and Poland qualifies according to ( ) and (¯), but ( ) = 0 < 2 =¯( ). Theorem 3.1 can also be applied due to Remark 3.1. Now we state a positive result, a 'pair' of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2. Let ( , ℳ, ) be a tournament with multiple group stages such that is a regular qualification rule and at least one of the following conditions hold:
• there does not exist , ∈ ∩ for any 1 ≤ ≤ and 1 ≤ ≤ ℓ;
• , ∈ and ∈ implies ∈ for all 1 ≤ ≤ .
Then the tournament with multiple group stages ( , ℳ, ) is strategy-proof.
Proof. If all preliminary round results obtained against other qualified teams are ignored (first condition), or carried over to the main round (second condition), then it makes no sense to perform weaker in the preliminary round due to the monotonicity of rankings in all groups.
Theorem 3.2 essentially says that teams qualifying from the same preliminary round group should be drawn into different main round groups (it is guaranteed if only one team qualifies from each preliminary round group), or all teams from a given preliminary round group should qualify for the same main round group.
It is also clear from the match discussed in Section 2 that head-to-head results cannot be used to break a tie in the main round between two teams from the same preliminary round group, otherwise there exists some incentives to influence the set of qualified teams.
Our main result is somewhat related to -but entirely independent of -the finding of Vong (2017) that in general multi-stage tournaments, the necessary and sufficient condition of strategy-proofness is to allow only the top-ranked player to qualify from each group. The difference is that in the model of Vong (2017) , teams deliberately lose matches in order to meet preferred opponents in the next round, so they only gain in expected value. Contrarily, we have discussed the possibility that a team can be strictly better off by a weaker performance.
Tournaments with multiple group stages
The European Men's Handball Championship between 1994 and 2000 consisted of a group stage followed by a knockout stage, hence they were incentive compatible. Since 2002, its format is the same as outlined in Section 2 and presented in Figure A .1 in the Appendix: a preliminary round with four groups of four teams each such that the first three teams qualify for the main round with two groups of six teams each, and they carry over the matches played against the two teams in their preliminary round group. The winners and runners-up of the main round groups qualify to the semifinals.
During the 10th Men's European Handball Championship (EHF Euro 2012), a situation analogous to the one presented in Section 2 emerged. Slovenia played its last match in Group D against Iceland when Croatia had 4 points after it won against Iceland and Slovenia, Norway had 2 points because of its win against Slovenia by 28-27, and Iceland had also 2 points due to its win against Norway by 34-32. Consequently, Slovenia should have won against Iceland for qualification to the main round, but it would be better not to win by more than 3 goals in order to carry over its result against Iceland. The actual results were Iceland vs Slovenia 32-34, and Croatia vs Norway 26-22, so the manipulation of Slovenia turned out to be successful (with Iceland vs Slovenia 31-34 or 32-35, Iceland still would have qualified, but 30-34, 31-35, or 32-36 would be unfavourable for Slovenia).
The Women's European Handball Championship is the official competition for senior women's national handball teams of Europe. It takes place in the same years as Men's European Handball Championship, and is organised according to same design, so it was also strategy-proof until 2000, but it is incentive incompatible from 2002.
The Women's EHF Champions League is an annual official competition for women's handball clubs of Europe since the season of 1993/94. It is the most competitive and prestigious tournament for the top clubs of the continent's leading national leagues. The tournament is organised with multiple group stages since 2013/14. The preliminary round consists of four groups of four teams each, playing each other twice in home and away matches such that the best three teams qualify. In the main round, two groups of six teams are formed, and teams play twice, in home and away matches against those three teams they have not already faced. The top four teams from each group advance to the quarter-finals.
The World Men's Handball Championship, organised by the IHF (International Handball Federation), takes place in every second year since 1993. From 1995, the number of competing teams has increased to twenty-four, and four different tournament formats have been used (Csató, 2018e) . Among them, three designs violate incentive compatibility because of Theorem 3.1.
Since 1995, the World Women's Handball Championship is played in the same years as the men's tournament, and it is designed in the same format with the exception of 1995, 2003, and 2011. Table 3 summarises the incentive incompatible handball tournaments discussed above. They all contain two multiple group stages, and the number of qualified teams in the main round (see the last column) is the number of teams which have a chance to win the tournament.
Tournaments with multiple group stages are also used in other sports, for instance, in basketball (EuroBasket 2013), cricket (2007 Cricket World Cup) (Scarf et al., 2009) , and volleyball (2014 FIVB Volleyball Men's World Championship). There was a match played by Australia and West Indies in the 1999 Cricket World Cup, in which Australia probably attempted a manipulation similar to the one presented in Section 2 (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.7 .2). However, this plan -if there was one -did not work out entirely.
The 1999-2000 UEFA Champions League, as well as the following three seasons of this tournament, also included two group stages: from the first group stage of eight groups with four teams each, eight winners and eight runners-up were drawn into four groups of four teams each, containing two group winners and two runners-up such that teams from the same country or from the same first round group could not be drawn together. Consequently, no results were carried over to the second group stage, guaranteeing the incentive compatibility of the design according to Theorem 3.2.
Two ways of overcoming incentive incompatibility
It is clear from our theoretical results, presented in Section 3, that there is no straightforward way to guarantee the strategy-proofness of tournaments with multiple group stages, in contrast to tournament systems consisting of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments (Dagaev and Sonin, 2017) , or group-based qualifiers with a repechage (Csató, 2018c) .
Theorem 3.2 shows that incentive compatibility is met if either all points scored in the preliminary round are considered in the main round (directly or after an arbitrary monotonic transformation), or all of them are discarded, which is against the essence of these tournaments. Consequently, if the administrators want to organise a strategy-proof tournament with multiple group stages, the only solution is to carry over all preliminary round results to the main round, perhaps after a monotonic transformation, regardless that some matches were played against teams already eliminated from the tournament.
However, it seems that if all results are carried through, then the subsequent stage loses a bit of excitement because there will be greater variation in points at the commencement of that stage, and teams entering bottom will find it much harder to catch up to the teams entering the stage on top.
This effect can be mitigated by carrying over only half of the points from the preliminary round. The idea comes from the Belgian First Division A, the top league competition for association football clubs in Belgium, where the sixteen competitors play a double round-robin tournament in the regular season, followed by a championship play-off for the first six teams such that the points obtained during the regular season are halved.
For tie-breaking purposes, we suggest to retain the number of goals scored and conceded in the preliminary round. Theoretically, they can be ignored, too, but it seems to be unfair when there was a match played in the preliminary round against a team from the same main round group. In the case of Belgian First Division A, goal difference is not among the tie-breaking criteria in the championship playoffs.
Therefore, two strategy-proof versions of each tournament design with multiple group stages can be defined. In the following, the consequences of these modifications will be explored as a kind of cost-benefit analysis via simulations.
Our starting point is a comparison of tournament formats for the World Men's Handball Championships (Csató, 2018e) . Section 4 have revealed that this tournament has applied recently three formats containing multiple group stages (see Table 3 ). We investigate two of them, since the third suffers from various problems and seems to be inefficient (Csató, 2018e) . They are the following: The 2019 championship will also be organised in this format (IHF, 2018) . The preliminary round (see Figure A .2a) consists of four groups of six teams each such that the top three teams qualify for the main round. The main round consists of two groups of six teams, each created from two preliminary round groups. The top two teams of every main round group advance to the semifinals in the knockout stage (see Figure A .2b).
• Format 46: This design, presented in Figure A .3, has been used in the 2007 World Men's Handball Championship, hosted by Germany. Teams are drawn into six groups of four teams each in the preliminary round (see Figure A .3a) such that the top two teams proceed to the main round. The main round consists of two groups, each created from three preliminary round groups. Four teams of every main round group advance to the quarterfinals in the knockout stage (see Figure A .3b).
While the knockout stage of both tournament formats is immediately determined by the preceding group stage, the competing teams should be drawn into groups before the start of the tournament, so the seeding policy may affect the outcome, too (Guyon, 2015; Dagaev and Rudyak, 2016; Guyon, 2017; Laliena and López, 2018) .
Hence -similarly to Csató (2018e) -two variants of each tournament design, called seeded and unseeded, are considered. In the seeded version, the preliminary round groups are drawn such that in the case of groups with teams ( = 4 for 46 and = 6 for 66), the strongest teams are placed in Pot 1, the next strongest teams in Pot 2, and so on. The unseeded version uses fully random seeding. Consequently, some strong teams, allocated in a harsh group will have more difficulties in qualifying than certain weaker teams, allocated in an easier group. Table 4 shows the twelve tournament designs to be analysed.
The tournament metrics applied are as follows:
• the average pre-tournament ranking of the winner, the second-, the third-and the fourth-placed teams;
• the expected quality of the final (the sum of the finalists' pre-tournament ranking);
• the expected competitive balance of the final (the difference between the finalists' pre-tournament ranking).
The simulation procedure is detailed in Csató (2018e) . According to the arguments presented there, all simulations have been implemented with one million runs. Figure 1 shows the average pre-tournament ranking of the first four teams. If all points are carried over from the preliminary round, then the result of the tournament becomes more predetermined as the expected ranking slightly decreases. Preserving only the half of these points significantly mitigates the loss of excitement, except in the unseeded variant of format 46. On the other hand, the average rank of the winner is even higher in the case of seeded 46 according to this solution than under the original incentive incompatible design. Furthermore, carrying over half of all points minimises the effect of the seeding policy, which seems to be desirable because it is a factor not influenced by the competitors. Thus the price of guaranteeing incentive compatibility seems to be negligible -at least compared to other features of the design like the particular tournament format or the seeding policy -, and we suggest to carry over half of the points scored in the preliminary round. Applying this solution has another, unexpected advantage by minimizing the effects of the preliminary seeding of the teams into pots.
Conclusions
Optimal design of sports ranking rules is an important topic of economics and operations research. We have revealed that administrators should not miss analysing strategyproofness: a simple shortcoming in the design of a tournament can lead to perverse incentives in a sporting contest that is supposed to be genuine, and as such is sold to the public as having full integrity. While the actual probability of manipulation can be relatively small, and the audience does not necessarily recognise the problem, it makes no sense to risk a potential scandal which has enormous financial and reputational costs. Our simulation model has also proved that the price of guaranteeing incentive compatibility can be marginal, and the use of a fair mechanism does not affect essentially the selective ability and the competitive balance of a tournament with multiple group stages.
It is somewhat surprising that we have not found any controversy about the particular match presented in Section 2. We think it is because of its non-trivial detection as compared to the football and basketball matches discussed in Section 1, it was enough to make some mistakes in defence or attack, without the need to score own goals. One can understand that EHF remained silent on this issue, and the audience obviously did not study the tie-breaking rules carefully. On the other hand, it is almost sure that the coaches and players knew that they should not make great efforts to win by a higher margin. Hopefully, our discussion will contribute to placing this match in the category of the notorious 'Nichtangriffspakt (Schande) von Gijón' 4 (Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.1) in the history of sports.
There are some directions for future scientific research. First, by the quantification of team strengths and the modelling of match outcomes, the probability of manipulation can be estimated. Second, fairness of a tournament is a more general notion than incentive compatibility as the 2016 UEFA European Championship (Guyon, 2017) , the 2026 FIFA World Cup (Guyon, 2018) , the scheduling of round-robin tournaments (Krumer and Lechner, 2017; Krumer et al., 2017a,b; Sahm, 2018) , or the problem of penalty shootouts (Palacios-Huerta, 2012 Brams and Ismail, 2018; Csató, 2018a) show. The final aim may be an extensive axiomatic discussion and comparison of sports ranking rules, which has started recently (Arlegi and Dimitrov, 2018; Berker, 2014; Csató, 2017b Csató, , 2018b Vaziri et al., 2018) . 
